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1 
Ellen Lewin 
Commodifying Same-
Sex Marriage in the 
United States: 
Medicalization, Morality, 
and Mental Health 
2 
In the spring of 2005, 
the membership of the 
American Psychological 
Association approved a 
resolution backing same-sex 
marriage "in the interest of 
maintaining and promoting 
mental health." Both this 
organization and its sister 
professional group, the 
American Psychiatric 
Association, have long 
attended to the mental health 
ramifications of 
homosexuality, and famously, 
back in the early 1970S, the 
psychiatrists voted to remove 
homosexuality from the list of 
mental disorders enumerated 
in its Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM).l 
That decision, along with the 
earlier work of the Kinsey 
researchers and the 
revolutionary psychological 
studies conducted by Evelyn 
Hooker, has long been 
heralded as having paved the 
way for gay and lesbian people 
to dispute characterizations of 
their sexuality as clinically 
abnormal.2 With this 
assurance that homosexuality 
did not stem from an 
inherently disordered psyche, 
lesbians and gay men and 
other members of 
sexual/gender minorities have 
Commodifying Same-Sex Marriage 
been able not only to seek relief from persecution, but to 
launch an ambitious movement for civil rights. 
Judgments about the mental health of non-heterosexuals have 
clearly played a part in the gains made over the last few decades and it 
would be foolish to minimize the power of such professional asse;sments 
to influence public opinion-or the degree to which such views are 
~emselves shaped by changing public opinion. But of late, a somewhat 
different ~gument about lesbian/gay rights and mental health, specifically 
surrounding demands for same-sex marriage, has surfaced in the United 
States, and I would like to raise some concerns about how these issues are 
coming to be deployed. An article by psychiatrist Robert Kertzner and 
anthropologist Gilbert Herdt, for example, argues forcefully that same-sex 
couples should have access to legal marriage because of the mental health 
benefits they would thereby realize. Although this position resonates with 
many mental health professionals, I believe it demands careful and critical 
examination.3 
I will contend that while estimations of the mental health 
adv~tages of ~arriage may have some strategic utility in approaching 
particular audiences, e.g., psychologists and psychiatrists, a political 
strate!?' that puts. mental health at its center is ill-considered and 
potentially productive of questionable alliances. I base my position on 
conce~s about what scholars, clinicians, and activists mean by "mental 
health, as .well as on my alarm over a growing convergence between 
arguments lo favor of marriage equality for same-sex couples and the 
larger .marriage promotion movement that has surfaced in the United 
Sta~e~ lo re~nt years in close association with efforts to "reform" welfare 
POlICIes. I WIll argue, as well, that these associations reflect a growing 
comm?dification o~ marriage and mental health as both come increasingly 
to be linked to relative affluence. 
Beyond ~oncerns about these findings themselves, I am 
uncomfortable WIth .any approach to lesbian and gay rights that uses a 
mental health paradIgm to frame notions of entitlement and citizenship 
even as I am. personally sympathetic to the struggle by gay and lesbia~ 
people to gam access to legal marriage.4 As a cultural anthropolOgist 
whose work has long addressed that complex of ideas behaviors and 
symbols tha~ compri~e what we usually gloss as "family"' and "kinship," I 
take a keen lOterest lo the ways these categories are defined in different 
cul~ral contexts. My approach stands in contrast to trends in queer 
stu~es that have tended to neglect this area of behavior and identity 
Particularly at the .. level real life, reflecting an assumption that 
transgresSIve sexualIties, however they are defined, are always already 
separat~~ or should. be separable from the mundane social domain of 
domestiCI~ and famI!Y.s !he ~~phasis in this body of work typically lies 
on sexualIty and desIre, ImplICItly separating these domains from other 
elements of daily life and identity. 
.Some scholars have gone further and have sharply criticized efforts 
of lesbIans and gay men to achieve any of the insignia of family legitimacy6 
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or have sought, with little regard for empirical evidence, to cas~ queer 
families as axiomatically subversive.7 Commentators on both SIdes of 
debates about queerness and assimilation voice surprisingly similar 
arguments, drawn in my view on deeply essentialized assumptio~s about 
the nature of homosexuality as a fixed and predictable set of behavIOrs and 
desires.8 In both cases, departure from heterosexual convention is 
understood as rooted in specific non-normative sexual proclivities, urges 
that may be seen as disordered and evil by opponents of gay rights or that 
may be valorized by their proponents, but which in ei~er case are th?ught 
to be displayed in a range of sexual and cultural behaVIors at odds WIth all 
sorts of conventionality. Such positions amount to what I have labeled 
"queer fundamentalism" when espoused by theorists who position 
themselves as non-heterosexual.9 
The resultant myopia concerning lesbian/gay life and families has 
meant, on one level, that lesbian and gay social worlds have long been 
construed as almost completely lacking in family or kinship connections, 
except insofar as the language of relatedness is used metaphori~lly or 
applied through "choice" to friends. to Prev~ent imag~ of lesb~an/gay 
cultures and communities are of bounded, mwardly-onented umverses, 
the frontiers around them understood as a sort of no-man's land in which 
nearly aU fear to tread. Marriage and family simply don't have a place in 
this terrain. 
But questioning the use of mental health paradigms as a way to 
argue for equal access to marriage need not be inspired by ho~tility toward 
same-sex marriage or repudiation of the desires of some lesbIans and gay 
men to claim the rewards of domesticity. Nor need it ignore the fact that 
mental health arguments may have particular resonance with some 
audiences we may wish to reach and thus have a particular, though 
opportunistic, effectiveness. Nonetheless, the prospect of using same-~ex 
marriage as part of a larger effort to enhance the mental health of l~sbJa.n 
and gay people is a disturbing one, as well as an approach that I belIeve IS 
doomed to backfire. 
What are the arguments about same-sex marriage and mental 
health? Celia Kitzinger and Sue Wilkinson" have provided us with an 
excellent review of one strand of the mental health argument, one that 
emphasizes what might be called the oppression position, i.e., that lack of 
access to legal marriage is a form of oppression that has a range of 
deleterious effects on mental health, a claim that recalls positions taken in 
opposition to racial segregation, notably influenci~g the 1?54 Supreme 
Court decision in Bl"Own u. Board of Educahon, whIch outlawed 
segregation in public schools." The majority opini~n in that ~se h~ld that 
segregation was wrong because it made black children feel lOfenor and 
hence caused them psychological and intellectual harm, a judgment 
heavily influenced by Kenneth and Mamie Clark's famous doll pr~ference 
studies.'3 Whether such research is directly applicable to the expenence of 
lesbians and gay men certainly merits further investigation, though some 
parallels between various forms of discrimination obviously exist. 
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. Th~se arguments-tha.t discrimin~tion generates pathology-clearly 
c?nfhct WIth efforts, foundational to clrums to gay and lesbian civil rights 
smce the 1950S, to understand homosexual people Oike other members of 
sti~atized minor!ties) as fundamentally psychologically healthy.14 The 
notio~ that exclusIOn from key social institutions is primarily a form of 
emotio~al abuse to which stigmatized persons fall victim cannot be the 
foundation of a strategy to gain equal rights, Kitzinger and Wilkinson 
argue. 
But other approaches to same-sex marriage and mental health have 
been ~spired not by arguments about the harmful consequences of 
op?reSSlOn, but by a comparison with heterosexual marriage and a 
:elIance on stances t~en in support of marriage that have been deployed 
m a. r.ange of c?ntexts m the US-what we might call the happy marriage 
poslhon: Despite contr~~ctory data a~out the mental health implications 
of marna?e, these positions accept WIth little qualification the assertion 
that mamage has affirmatively positive emotional effects on both men and 
women, and that same-sex couples ought to be able to share these 
benefits.'5 
Attempts to ground the quest for equality in the mental health 
benefi~ of marriage inevitably draw on data that only indirectly speak to 
the cucu~st~ces of lesbian and gay couples. The marriage and 
partne:shlp nghts offered to same-sex couples in the several European 
coun!Iies ?enerally do not offer complete equality with heterosexual 
mamage, msofar, as ~any of these countries place some restrictions on 
same-sex .couples abtlIty to adopt children or avail themselves of some 
other en~itlements associated with marriage. 16 Denmark was the first 
country (m 1989) ~o es~ablish some sort of same-sex registration option, 
but ~ther. countries. m Europe quickly followed suit, first across 
ScandmaVl~ and then m the Netherlands and Belgium (where both same-
sex ~nd dlffere.nt-sex couples now have the option to choose either 
m~.age or regIStered partnership). A range of other arrangements now 
eXist .m France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Fully equal access to 
mru:na?e was extend~d to gay and lesbian couples in Canada in 2003 in 
Spam 1D 2005, and m. South Africa in 2006. Some European countries 
~ffer .a r:mge of regIStration provisions, none of which are called 
I mama~e and some of which also offer a legal connection perceived as 
~s weighty than marriage to heterosexual couples, though there is 
eVlde~ce that ~ome couples actively view these unions as "marriage" 
sometimes adding ~r.emonial elements to the registration process to ma;k 
that status.'7 In addition, a number of jurisdictions around the world will 
ackn
d 
owledge ~r accord some level of recognition to same-sex marriages 
an partnerships enacted elsewhere.'8 
In 0~ United States, beginning with Berkeley California in 1984 
!on:ze mumclpal ~d state jurisdictions have approved measures that offe; 
anous sorts of ngh~ that approximate some features of marriage to 
sam~-s~x (and som~times opposite-sex) unmarried couples variously 
conslSting of domestic partner registration, extension of som~ employee 
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benefits (most notably health insurance) to same-sex partners, and the 
ability to claim legal standing that would permit particular kinds of 
litigation.'9 At the same time, in the US, a substantial number of public 
and private employers have begun to offer benefits to the same-sex 
partners of employees, though such efforts have been hampered in 
locations where anti-gay marriage measures have been passed by voters 
and have, in some instances, occasioned consumer boycotts by right-wing 
constituencies. 
As of this writing, three states in the US-Massachusetts, California, 
and Connecticut-have made marriage legal for same-sex couples, though 
the entitlements such couples can claim stop at the state borders.20 With 
the impending threat of a constitutional amendment ~Massachu.se~) and 
a ballot initiative (California) that defines marnage as hIDIted to 
heterosexual unions, couples can hardly settle into their marriages 
confidently. A constantly changing roster of states offers some variant of 
"marriage lite," including Vermont's civil union mechanism. The legal 
standing of all of these measures, at least in the US, remains quite fluid at 
the same time that more countries are establishing some sort of 
recognition for same-sex marriages, whether they move to institute such 
processes themselves or merely to recogn~e unions solemniz~d. elsew~ere. 
Brazil, for example, instituted a policy m 2003 of recogntzmg uruons 
performed elsewhere for purposes ofimmigration.2 1 
All of this flux- the situation changes almost day to day-and the 
shallow time frame within which legally recognized same-sex marriage or 
partnership has existed, mean that arguments that marriage has any 
particular mental health effects on same-sex co~ples can. only be made 
indirectly and with heavy reliance on rhetOriC. That IS, we cannot 
empirically assess how marriage affects the mental ~ealth status of 
married same-sex couples over time when there are Virtually no such 
people available to investigate. Further, since what is considered marriage 
or what particular couples interpret as marriage vary across a wide range 
of legal and ceremonial arrangements, there is n~ way to legitimat~ly 
compare the experience of same-sex couples WIth that of mamed 
heterosexuals. 
In the absence of direct evidence, some proponents of same-sex 
marriage have based their positions on analogies drawn from studies of 
heterosexual couples, most notably the work of Linda .Waite and her 
associates 22 which claim that both mental and phYSical health are 
enhanced by legal marriage. In other instances, argumen~ i.n favor of the 
right to marry have been based on the pre~umed pO~ltive. effects of 
achieving public recognition for such committed relationships. !hese 
approaches depend on previous findings, l~rgely based "on n.arrativ; or 
anecdotal evidence that speak to the benefiCial effects of commg out on 
feelings of well-b~ing and self-esteem (to mention just some of the 
variables that might be mentioned) a~d. others . that su~est .that 
community support helps to sustain and solIdify commltted relationships. 
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THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE 
. . !here is an enormous corpus of research from a range of 
discIplines-psychology, economics, sociology, history, and others-that 
addresses the advantages (heterosexual) marriage may provide couples 
and spokes~ersons for this set of comparisons draw on a range of finding~ 
to m~e theIr case. Some of these data appear to present solid evidence for 
the VIew that particular indi.cators of mental health (as well as physical 
heal~) can be correlated WIth marital status in particular populations 
studied under specific circumstances. For example, a number of 
reseru:chers have conducted longitudinal studies that follow the 
expenences of those wh? marry a~d those who do not, as indicated by self-
;ep?rt.23 In these studIes, baselIne data on a variety of mental health 
mdicators are compared with outcomes after various marital pathways. 
These researche;s generally c?ncl.ude ~at stabl~ marriage (at least during 
a five-~ear penod. of examInation) IS assocIated with freedom from 
depress~on, expressIOns ?f happiness with life in general, self-esteem, and 
other di~ers.e measures Including personal mastery, autonomy, having a 
purpose In life, and personal growth. In contrast, those who did not marry 
dunng the research period or who married and then separated or divorced 
showed corresponding deficits in these same areas."'! 
The direction of these findings is not uniform, nor do assertions 
~bout why such advantages occur necessarily argue for the same causal 
hnks. ~e explanations Waite and Gallagher offer for marriage being 
benefiCIal to mental health (among other areas) variously focus on the 
salutary effects of intim~cy and emotional support, the security gained 
from ~e greater coI?mItr~'lent presumed to accompany legal marriage 
(even m the fac~ of high divorce rates), the protection spouses offer each 
ot:her from phYSIcal hazards (though this argument usually identifies the 
WIfe ~s the p~otector of both spouses), and often, the economic advantages 
assocIated WIth marriage .. Whether any of these attributes, but especially 
those. connected to finanCIal wherewithal, are causes or effects of marriage 
remams a matter of controversy.'s 
Obviously, many questions can be raised about the credibility of 
such data, based as they are on aggregate epidemiological data or self 
reports and responses to questionnaires administered in artificial settings 
not least about their appli~tion to the immense complexity of real life: 
~o~ably the most compellIng set of criticisms of these conclusions raise 
e Issue of how to evaluate "good: ver~us "bad" marriages, particularly as 
we have become aware of pe~asIve VIolence in the latter- however they re defined. Num~rous studIes of domestic violence reveal that class 
~~ors, and especIally extreme poverty, are linked to high rates of ;0 ence. The P?or a:e also. the group least likely to marry, thus suggesting 
at couples WI~ hIgher Incomes may have greater chances of marital 
success, along WIth lesser vulnerability to domestic violence .• 6 
In other words, those who are destined to be able to manage the 
most successful marriages are, in fact, the very same population most 
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likely to marry. Those with fewer economic resources, already at risk for 
domestic violence and other hazards that might have negative emotional 
impacts, generally do not find their way into the statistics on marital 
mental health. Similarly, it might be argued that those with better overall 
mental stability and other emotional qualities that might contribute to a 
harmonious marital life are already more likely to marry and to have 
successful marriages than those individuals with mental health deficits. 
Selection factors, in other words, may account for the correlations between 
mental health indicators and marriage, despite researchers' claims that 
their longitudinal designs eliminate such biases. 
In an effort to directly address the experience of same-sex couples, 
psychologist Lawrence Kurdek has compared gay and lesbian cohabiting 
couples with heterosexual married couples along such dimensions of 
"relationship quality" as intimacy, autonomy, equality, constructive 
problem solving, and barriers to leaving the marriage. He then assesses 
the relationship between these variables and two "relationship outcomes" 
during a five-year longitudinal study. While the overall results indicate 
that relationship quality and relationship outcome, i.e., continuation or 
dissolution, are linked similarly for heterosexual and homosexual couples, 
numerous methodological problems can be raised in trying to extrapolate 
from heterosexual married couples to gay men and lesbians. Like other 
studies of its kind, Kurdek's involved a rather homogeneous, non-random 
sample of well-educated subjects and depended on self reporting for its 
findings. More critical, of course, is the absence of any direct way to 
compare the possible effects of marital status on two populations whose 
legal relationship to marriage is totally different. Nor does this approach 
allow for an examination of how gender itself may shape perceptions of 
relationship quality.'7 
THE CASE FOR COMING OUT 
Claims about the benefits of coming out are largely based on studies 
conducted by clinicians. ' s Related research shows a range of deleterious 
effects of concealing one's sexual identity, including an elevated risk for 
suicide, HIV infection, and exposure to sexual violence.'9 They draw on 
knowledge about how people experience all forms of stigma, including the 
notion, famously put forward by Erving Goffman,30 that stigmatized 
individuals must devote considerable energy to "managing" fueir identities 
and to assessing the risk in particular situations of allowing fueir identities 
to become known. Stigmatized identities, this literature indicates, "spoil" 
or supersede other aspects of identity, and eifuer preventing discovery or 
manipulating it in some way becomes an overriding preoccupat~on for 
such individuals. But even as fears about negative responses to commg out 
are warranted in many circumstances,31 individuals often report disclosure 
to be a liberating experience fuat enables fuem to validate their sense of 
self.3' . 
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Beyond the clinical data, the celebration of coming out as a 
necessary feature of forming a stable homosexual identity and the 
testimonials that are typical features of personal accounts seem to be 
~e~e~ by .the ~alue NOrth. American culture places on honesty and 
mdiVIdual mtegnty. Along WIth these values, the individualistic ethos that 
is particularly central to the culture of the US prizes the authenticity of 
personal narratives as unassailable evidence of experience and hence 
"~th".33 By the same token, concealing one's "true" identity is widely 
believed to be both personally unhealthy and potentially harmful to others, 
as accounts of members of stigmatized populations who "pass" as 
members of more esteemed groups amply demonstrate. 
While such experiences may .not always be analogous, the images of 
the black person who passes as white, of the Jew who allows him/herself 
to be taken for pentile, an~ the homosexual who pretends to be straight 
nearly ~ways ~nvoke no.tions that passing betrays one's family and 
community, typically leading to tragic results. Such outcomes may occur 
on a personal lev~l and be ~emonstrated by displays of pathological, and 
even self-d~truc!l~e, behaVIor. They also may be understood to be more 
communal In their Impact, as the person who passes risks alienation from 
the. community o~ ~ose with ,,:,hom the stigmatized identity is shared, 
whl.le never establishing secure hnks with the community to which he/she 
asplres.34 
.Such jud~ents are supported by the evidence of personal 
narratives of vanou.s so~-confessions of those who have passed and 
come ~o regret .thelr actions as cowardly, and testimonials about the 
exultation expenenced by those who own up to their "true" identities. In 
fact, the coming-out story has been one of the central cultural devices that 
has fr~ed the gay and lesbian rights movement in the West· it takes a 
narrative form that is distinctive in some features, but that alsd resembles 
the larger genre of the bildungsroman.35 
The ~ncritical val.orization of "coming out" assumes that identities 
are fixed, smgu1~, .and Inherent to individuals who must be conscious of 
th~m. Secrecy, hiding-even behaviors that might constitute a wish for 
pnvacy-are e.xcoriated in this discourse as concealment and evidence of 
shame, sometimes .constructed. as "i~tern~ized homophobia." Rarely do 
we rea~ ~path~tic a~ounts In which discretion about one's sexual (or 
other) I.dentity might elt~er hav~ a positive outcome, e.g., by allowing for 
the mamtenanc:e of.parti~ular kinds of relationships, enhancing earning 
power, or of situations In which "openness" results from pressure to 
conform tha.t compe~s collusion with identity definitions imposed by 
oth~rs. In. ~IS analYSIs of gay adolescents' uses of silence in their life 
stones, ':Vil!lam Leap has observed that condemnation of the "closet" may 
ob~cun~ Its ~mportance not only as a site of denial, but also as a location in 
which a stmpler and less threatening form of gay experience" can be 
f!act:d. "If the closet is part. ~f gay c~lture, then the closet, too, has a 
gu ~e-a language that pnVIleges szlence over speech, restraint over 
expreSSion, concealment over cooperation, safety over risk. "36 
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Mental health-based arguments in favor of same-sex marriage 
rights raise concerns, then, in terms of how such positions are derived and 
argued. They are based not on solid evidence, but on a set of analogies and 
generalizations themselves drawn from questionable sources. They rest on 
assumptions that same-sex partnerships are readily comparable in key 
dimensions to heterosexual marriages, and on extrapolations from the 
subjective body of knowledge provided by clinical accounts of coming out 
and bolstered by popular coming-out and other personal narratives. And 
they assume a particular sort of relationship between marriage and mental 
health that, as we shall see, is far from transparent. 
WHAT'S THE OPPOSITE OF MENTAL HEALTH? 
Besides the problem of drawing analogies between the as yet 
virtually non-existent phenomenon of same-sex marriage and either 
heterosexual marriage or the coming out experience, the mental health 
paradigm generates some more specific concerns as well. The most 
obvious and disturbing image is of gay and lesbian people, who in the vast 
majority of locations are now, and have always been, ineligible for legal 
marriage, being therefore less well-endowed with "mental health" than 
married people. Are they more prone to psychological disturbances merely 
because of their unmarried status? 
If we take the idea of a link between marriage and mental health to 
its logical conclusion, it seems to me that we find ourselves moving toward 
undoing the positive impact of the decision by the American Psychiatric 
Association to de-pathologize homosexuality. Under these conditions, it 
would not be the direction of sexual desire or the disruptions of 
conventional gender norms that would label homosexuals "sick," but their 
lack of participation in the institution of marriage. As circular as such 
reasoning may seem, there is sufficient hostility to gay and lesbian people 
today to make access to such an easy form of stigma an attractive 
alternative to seemingly more toxic forms of bias. 
Attempts to ascertain levels of "mental health" and to connect them 
with "marriage" are problematic as well when we consider how imprecise 
those terms are. Whose marriages are we talking about, and how do we 
account for the mental health benefits they allegedly confer? That is, 
assuming that a generic condition known as "marriage" has some positive 
effects on mental health, what is the mechanism by which this is thought 
to occur? Which aspects of mental health are affected? I can imagine a 
number of benefits conferred by marriage that would be difficult to 
extrapolate to non-heterosexuals: the communal recognition ~at 
accompanies the change from single to married, or the fact that marned 
couples conventionally include wage-earning men and thus are better off 
than individuals on their own or two women living together. Can we 
assume that marriage bestows the same benefits across divisions of so~ial 
class, race, and ethnicity-or across the many other cultural boundaries 
that crisscross US society? 
10 
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Even the most earnest advocates of the benefits of marriage are 
hard-pressed to unravel the distinction between the institution's economic 
advantages and the salutary effects they claim it has on mental and 
physical health. These economic benefits can easily be traced to the effects 
of having an employed male contributing to the household; given the lower 
rates of marriage among the poor, this male is likely to be at least middle-
class. But do they result from or cause the positive mental health outcomes 
these researchers claim to have found? How much emotional distress, one 
cannot help but wonder, is the product of insecure financial 
circ~stances-downward mobility, deindustrialization, the growing 
prormnence of employment in the service sector. None of these conditions 
pro~otes mental health, and none of them are positively associated with 
marn~ge rates. Some of the .s~holars in ~is field give passing attention to 
these I~sues,.but none are Wlllmg to conSider how thoroughly their images 
of mantal bliss are grounded in economic security.37 The enthusiasm with 
which some of the pro-marriage scholars invoke the economic benefits of 
mar.riage comes perilously close to sounding like a get-rich-quick scheme 
for I?stantly.solving the financial predicaments of many currently living 
outside marriage. 
Then. there ar~ ~actors associated with heterosexual marriage that 
may have either pOSitive or negative effects; here I am thinking of the 
consequence~ ?f the institution's intersection with conventional gender 
roles. Does hvmg under the sway of these norms contribute to "mental 
health" equally for men and women, and how would this translate in a 
same:sex partnership? Those who celebrate the mental health benefits of 
marnage have been eager to sweep aside the visionary work of Jessie 
Bernard, who more than 30 years ago argued that marriages needed to be 
understood as ~iffe~ent institutions for men and women.38 In her reading, 
men ~enefited m direct ways from the services of women while women 
were. likely to suffer in various ways from their subordinated roles in these 
r.elationships. W?ile lines of authority in marriage are by no means as 
linear as convention framed them before the influences of feminism began 
to be felt and women's employment became a virtual necessity for all but 
the most affluent families, the continuing prevalence of domestic violence 
:md an. unequ~ division of household labor both speak to the ongoing 
mequality that IS a feature of at least some heterosexual marriages.39 
Of course, those couples who do have significant economic 
resources are precisely those who can buy themselves out of some of the 
more oppressive manifestations of gender inequality. If service employees 
can ~e engage~ to undertake the more onerous aspects of domesticity-
cleanmg, cooking, laundry, and child care-then it is likely that stresses 
caused by female subordin~tion will fade into the background, even as 
women, by and. large, ~ontinue to have major responsibility for making 
sure all the .servlce pr?VJders complete their work. But perhaps that is not 
the mechamsm by whICh marriage confers its apparent benefits. We do not 
really know. 
11 
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And that is just looking at the United States. Is "mental health" 
everywhere measured by the same criteria? Do all cultures assess it 
according to individual attributes, or are there locations where we must 
look for a more communal reading of "mental health"? Medical 
anthropologists can attest to the fact that the assessment of mental health 
and illness is accomplished very differently in different cultures, with stark 
disparities cross-culturally in the numbers of persons diagnosed with 
particular conditions.4o Do the mental health advantages presumed to be 
associated with marriage also accrue where other systems of marriage, 
such as polygamy, are normative? Do they apply in cultures where 
marriage operates as a mechanism for ordering social, economic, and 
political alliances rather than a site for intimacy and emotional support? 
MEDICALIZING RELATIONSHIPS 
Framing equality in terms of "mental health" depends on a 
paradigm of medicalization, a form of social control that historically has 
rarely been employed in the service of disempowered or marginalized 
populations.41 Feminist scholars have long documented, for example, the 
ways in which the medicalization of women's ordinary reproductive 
experience can have a variety of pernicious effects on their social status, 
and arguably on their mental health as well. These processes of 
medicalization undermine women's ability to trust their own embodied 
experience, leading to soaring rates of interventions, at least some of 
which are not medically necessary. They also institutionalize medical 
surveillance over the most personal domains of life, obstructing women's 
ability to make decisions on their own behalf.42 
Perhaps it is not surprising that a medical model of the right to 
marry would emerge in the present historical moment when such 
technologies as Viagra, assisted reproduction, prenatal diagnostic 
techniques, cosmetic and gender reassignment surgeries, and other 
interventions British sociologist Ken Plummer has dubbed "the 
medicalizing of intimacy"43 are proliferating and arguably having their 
own effects on sexuality and marriage. Increasingly, variations that were 
simply part of the routine fabric of life have moved into a domain that 
makes them "treatable." As some advocates for the disabled have argued, 
the availability of prenatal diagnostic methods for conditions that may not 
be life-threatening may lead to a devaluation of all human variability, and 
even of cultures shared by persons with specific conditions (e.g., 
deafness).44 
Comparable arguments have surrounded the ubiquitous use of 
prenatal diagnosis to determine the sex of the fetus, whiclJ in a number of 
countries (e.g., India and China) have led to selective abortion of (usually) 
female offspring.45 Are "imperfections" of any sort to be tolerated, or 
should they all be obliterated by the power of medical treatment? Will 
women who re.fuse to undergo diagnostic procedures or undertake 
therapies indicated by the results of diagnoses be held responsible for 
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producing disabled offspring?46 And does the availability of such 
technologies, at least to those who can afford to employ them, pose the 
prospect of embodying class distinctions in previously unimaginable 
ways?47 
. Me~calization ,Presents particularly problematic issues for gay 
ng~ts as It expan~ mto the area of sexual functioning.48 Use of the 
vanous pharmaceutical products that have taken aim at so-called erectile 
dysfunctio~ ~ presumably fr~el.y chosen, but as these technologies become 
mo;e sophisticated and specialized, will that always be the case? How will 
theIr. expanded us~ affect popular understandings of "normal" sexual 
functi?nmg? How big ~ s~ep might it be from "treating" sexual dysfunction 
to seemg all sexual vanation, as well as the emotional fabric of sexuality in 
medicalized tenns?49 ' 
Medicaliz.ation al~o r:uses ye~ other worrisome questions that hinge 
on the temporality of SCientific findings. What if later research contradicts 
the data that support the salutary effects of marriage? Do claims to the 
~ental health benefits of marriage then evaporate, going the same way as 
diets ~as~d on heavy consumption of red meat? In other words, can we 
only JUstify demands for same-sex marriage rights as long as we can 
demonstrate a correlation between such rights and good mental health? 
. Even if we forego a broad cross-cultural survey and look only at the 
Umted States, we can se~ that notion~ of who is mentally ill vary 
enonnously, even over relatively short pen ods of time. A recent survey, for 
example,. suggested that more than half of Americans will develop a 
me~tal disorder ove~ their lifetimes.50 And the DSM, which as I mentioned 
earlie~ de-pathololP~ed homosexuality in its 1973 edition (thereby 
declanng several mIlhon people instantly "cured"), has, for the most part, 
adde~ r~the: than subtracted mental disorders to its inventory of 
psychiatric diagnoses. The total number of disorders listed amounted to 
some 60 categories in 1952, but now boasts about 300 conditions and 
syndromes. ~an w~ expect that homosexuality or failure to marry might 
not turn up mto th~s powerful compendium as time goes on? Both mental 
health and mental illness are moving targets, shifting, some would argue, 
to meet ~e pressures of the pharmaceutical industry or to coincide with 
the reqUlrements of health insurance.51 
WHAT ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS? 
. . Another concern speaks to longer range strategies. As Kitzinger and 
Wilkinson argue, the use of a mental health paradigm draws our attention 
away fro~ mo~els that would be more appropriate to the matter of same-
sex m~age rIghts. The language of the 1948 United Nations Universal 
Declaration of .Human Rights might help us think about the issue of equal 
access to mamage as a matter of equality before the law and the right of 
each person to legal recognition, both listed as inalienable human rights in 
the do~ument. The ~eclar~tion also includes the following: "No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary Interference with his privacy, family, home or 
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correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone 
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks."52 Historian Nancy Cott has shown that marriage has long 
functioned as a marker of citizenship in the US; this clause in the 
Declaration speaks directly to the central problem that exclusion from 
marriage poses for lesbians and gay men, as it once did for enslaved people 
and Asian immigrants.53 Does a mental health focus really enhance our 
ability to deploy a human rights paradigm? 
While I have some discomfort with the universalizing language of 
human rights discourse, my mention of the paradigm is not just 
hypothetical. Such language, rather than prognostications about mental 
health, in fact penneates legal decisions that have been made in support of 
same-sex marriage or other rights of lesbian and gay people. In the 2004 
decision in the Massachusetts case, Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health, for example, the justices explained their ruling in support of same-
sex marriage as follows: 
Barred access to the protections, benefits, and 
obligations of civil marriage, a person who 
enters into an intimate, exclusive Ullion with 
another of the same sex is arbitrarily deprived 
of membership in one of our community's most 
rewarding and cherished institutions. That 
exclusion is incompatible with the 
constitutional principles of respect for 
individual autonomy and equality under law.54 
Similarly, the Ontario court that ruled in Halpern v. Canada in 
2003, establishing the foundation for equal access to marriage in Canada, 
stated in part, 
Exclusion from marriage - a fundamental 
societal institution - perpetuates the view that 
same-sex relationships are less worthy of 
recognition than opposite-sex relationships. In 
doing so, it offends the dignity of persons in 
same-sex relationships.55 
In other words, the human rights-inflected language of 
fundamental human dignity can be used to craft arguments that are 
convincing in judicial contexts. Like Gayatri Spivak's notion of "strategic 
essentialism," such appeals may be intellectually suspect but nevertheless 
are evocative and effective. 56 The deployment of mental health is not the 
only argument that can be used opportunistically to capture the sympathy 
of an important audience. 
THE PERILS OF PRIVACY 
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. The language of mental health tends to invoke images of domestic 
pnvacy that I would argue obscure the workings of the "matrix of power 
rela~ons" in ~hich marri.age is actually embedded. 57 Yes, family and 
mantal dynamIcs unfold In spaces that are private, but they also are 
shaped by laws and politics, as well as by the inequalities that exist 
between parents and children, between men and women, and between 
groups that are positioned differently according to race economic status 
~d o~er distinctions. The language of mental health' instead implies ~ 
distanc10g between the public domain and the world of emotions, as 
~ough ~e latter unfol~s only in the realm of the private and domestic. It 
IS essential. to recognIze that the struggle for same-sex marriage has 
blossomed 10 a complex environment in which ideas about identities and 
the claims to citizenship they make possible intersect with notions of 
rights ~d responsib~ities. These dynamics cannot be captured by models 
that ?Ifurcate th~ pnvate and public; rather they are sites where these 
seemIngl~ OPPOSIn~ d~m~s .are .most .intimately connected. Marriage, 
after all, IS the SOCIal Institution In whIch a private sexual relationship 
receives public recognition. 
I am similarly suspicious of arguments for same-sex marriage that 
frame the entire debate as a quest for concrete benefits such as health 
coverage, pensions, and child custody, arguments that bear a marked 
resemblance to the mental health rationale. Clearly, those (and more than 
1,000 other) spe~ific entitlemen~s a:e, in the US, tied directly to marriage. 
But would marnage cease to eXIst If these benefits were distributed in a 
more equitable fas?ion? ~ll?1 of us ~till dream that the US will one day 
enter the commumty of cIVIlIzed nations that offers its citizens national 
health care, but would provision of universal health coverage really mean 
that there. would b.e no reason to get married? Has anything like that 
happened In countries that do offer such services? 
Ethnographic research on same-sex commitment ceremonies that 
were undertaken in. the complete a?sence of any sort of legal recognition 
sh?wed that matenal benefits, while not to be disparaged, are not the 
pnI?ary reason that people ~hoose t~ marry. Instead, couples' accounts 
1Odi~ted that the~ were making a va~lety of sometimes overlapping, even 
se~mIngly co!ltradIct~ry, statements In framing their desire to make their 
umons ~ubhc and. In formulating the specific ritual content of the 
ceremon~e~. The ntu~s allowed them to articulate membership in 
com~umties .of all Strip~s, connections to spiritual forces and religious 
tradition.s, clrums to ethmc and family ties- all intentions that transcended 
boundanes between sexually-defined populations. These couples wanted 
to make particul~ kinds of statements about themselves to the wider 
world, an~ matenal benefits served more to ratify their stances than to 
de~ne therr goals. For example, gifts might have monetary value, but they 
mrunly w~rk to demons~ate that the couple is really what they say they 
are-marned. Couples mlg~t perceive their mental health-experienced as 
a general sense of wellbeIng-to have been positively affected by their 
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weddings, but their objectives in staging these events go beyond these 
fleeting rewards.sB 
MENTAL HEALTH AS DURABLE GOOD 
Those who have created the current uproar about the status and 
future of marriage in the US have pointed to divorce rates, out-of-wedlock 
births, cohabitation, and other social behavior as indicators of the collapse 
of marriage as a central social institution and have suggested a host of 
other misfortunes that will accompany that collapse.59 However, the most 
sensible voices to enter the debate have demonstrated that marriage has 
not lost its importance, but rather has changed its meaning in the past few 
decades. In a recent article that addresses prognostications about the 
"future of marriage," sociologist Andrew Cberlin draws on evidence from a 
wide range of investigations to show that marriage has become not the 
entry point to adult life, but a valued marker of success and achievement. 
Cherlin argues that marriage has in fact grown in prestige, as evidenced by 
the visibility of elaborate weddings couples pay for themselves. Couples 
thereby demonstrate that they have reached the point in life where they 
are successful and stable enough to celebrate a marriage.60 
These findings are echoed in the work of Kathryn Edin and Maria 
Kefalas, whose 2005 study of low-income mothers (white, black and 
Latino) reveals that marriage is highly valued, indeed to such a degree that 
poor women fear taking such a momentous commitment lightly by 
marrying "only" because of getting pregnant. Even when they establish a 
household with their child's father and say they intend to marry him, they 
choose not to do so until both have reached a level of financial stability and 
have enough money to "do it right." Marriage, then, is not just regarded as 
a legal status that bestows particular entitlements on couples, but as a 
unique medium through which cultural and economic status may be 
marked.61 
It is not coincidental that the standard for doing a marriage "right" 
emerging in both of these analyses is economic. Indeed, Frank 
Furstenberg has suggested that marriage in fact perpetuates "a growing 
division in American society between the haves and the have-nots. 
Marriage, quite simply, is a form of having." Not only is it a form of 
"having," Furstenberg claims, but it has, in effect, become "a luxury 
consumer item, available only to those with the means to bring it off."62 
Considering the many documented benefits associated with marriage, 
Furstenberg continues, it emerges as "a cause and a consequence of 
economic, cultural, and psychological stratification in American society. 
The recent apparent increase in income inequality in the U.S. means that 
the population may continue to sort itself between those who are eligible 
for marriage and a growing number who are deemed ineligible to 
marry."63 
The deployment of "mental health" in the debate over same-sex 
marriage has much in common with the discussion of the immersion of 
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marriage in the calculus of inequality. Mental health, as used in much of 
the work discussed here and elsewhere, turns out to be another kind of 
durable good, something one wants to maximize because it is understood 
to be a good-and perhaps prestigious-thing to have. In a society as 
consumption-driven as the United States, value is often reduced to a range 
of amorphous and also highly individualistic mental health variables-self-
esteem, relationship satisfaction, and others. Under these conditions, 
"mental health" begins to look less like an exogenous factor that can be 
measured or enhanced than an element of a larger cultural preoccupation 
with consumption as a marker of success. 
STRANGE BEDFELLOWS 
Perhaps the most alarming aspect of the current infatuation with 
mental health as a charter for marriage rights is the company it condemns 
gayflesbian rights advocates to keep. The marriage promotion movement, 
represented by groups such as the Council on Families in America and the 
Institute fo~ American V~ue:" has advanced a number of arguments in 
support of I~ ~ropo~ents . VIew that legal marriage should be the only 
framework Wlthm which children are born. Primary among these has been 
a co~plex web of claims, outlined above, about the beneficial effects of 
~arnage on everyone involved- positive physical health outcomes are 
Cited,. as ~e men~ health correlations, personal safety allegedly 
associated WIth marnage, and healthy results for child development.64 
Those who have argued that the government should take a more 
active role in promoting and supporting legal marriage have also urged 
that a variety of pressures be brought to bear on those who do not fall into 
line-including tax consequences, eligibility criteria for various sorts of 
pub~~ support, and a revival of the stigmatization of divorce and 
Jl~egJtimacy. These efforts have been realized, to some extent, in the 
discourse ~urr?unding ~e "welfare reform" movement of the 1990S, which 
had a major VlCt?ry WIth t~e. p~sage of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportumty Reconclhation Act of 1996: Aid to Families with 
Dependent . ~hildren was transformed into Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Famlhes, a measure that includes lifetime limits on eligibility for 
benefits .. p~rt of the reasoning that inspired these changes is the notion 
that recelVlng welfare encourages women to have children out of wedlock 
and that su.ch .wom~n do not deserve public support. 65 
. . . A. slmJlar hne of reasoning has been used in a number of 
J~sdictions to deprive gay/lesbian individuals and couples from fostering 
(m Texas, for example) or from adopting (in Florida) children no matter 
how long these ~hil.dre~ have drifted in the foster-care ;ystem and 
regardless of their hkelihood to secure a placement with the sort of 
heterosexual family vaunted as "normal." Although there is no direct 
overlap at ~resent be~een opposition to same-sex marriage and hostility 
to gay/lesbian parenting, proponents of both positions tend to draw on 
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similar reasoning about what sorts of families are normal and worthy of 
respect. 
So the question of what sorts of alliances a mental health strategy 
will lead the same-sex marriage movement to adopt is perhaps the most 
compelling reason to exercise caution in deploying a mental health 
argument. The Bush administration's avowed commitment to promoting 
marriage has emerged simultaneously with its hostility to sharing the 
rewards of marriage and family with gay and lesbian citizens. It has been 
tied, as well, to efforts to link eligibility for various sorts of legal and 
economic benefits to heterosexual marriage, with threats to reinstitute the 
status of illegitimacy for children born out of wedlock and to deny 
assistance to impoverished families who fail to meet this standard. Gay 
and lesbian people who support the right to marry would do well to note 
these parallels and speak to them publicly.66 
In the context of the highly politicized discourse over marriage now 
occurring in the US, only part of which confronts demands of same-sex 
couples to equal access to its benefits, "mental health" emerges as neither 
specifiable nor as something that is necessarily desirable. There is no 
evidence that marriage rights would enhance mental health for gay and 
lesbian people and even less that attaining such rights would necessarily 
be accompanied by increased tolerance and inclusiveness in the wider 
society. Its deployment as a personal and societal "good" seems to me to be 
solidly embedded in a particular stratum of North American (and perhaps 
Western European) cultures-that which reflects the worldviews of 
educated, middle- and upper-class, predominantly white people. For those 
of us who do not have to struggle on a daily basis for raw survival, mental 
health has become a handy gloss for a range of "goods" that we try to 
maximize, goods that set the advantaged apart from a class of have-nots 
who have less access to such rewards. 
How we measure mental health or decide when we have it (or want 
it) depends a great deal on where we are personally situated-a sense of 
happiness, sexual satisfaction, adherence to standards of physical 
attractiveness, an absence of known symptoms of depression or other 
mental diseases- any of these may signal mental health. The more 
advantaged among us are uniquely positioned at this moment in history to 
use various sorts of instrumental means to achieve mental health, 
particularly through access not only to drugs and therapy modalities, but 
also to a host of consumer goods, the possession of which readily 
translates as happiness and satisfaction in a culture focused on continual 
material acquisition. Marriage, in fact, appears to be among the consumer 
goods that Americans seek, at least in the context of the mental health 
argument. In a culture in which "family privacy" can be used to conceal a 
host of miseries, including various forms of domestic violence, are we 
really willing to stake our rights on the assertion that marriage typically 
enhances "mental health"? 
Equal marriage rights, or any kind of equal rights for that matter, 
are something else entirely-a question of civil entitlement and cultural 
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citizenship-in fact, a matter of human rights. The debate over gaining 
these rights should be no different from struggles of years past for freedom 
from slavery, the right to vote, or legal abortion, or current battles to retain 
entitlements that are in jeopardy, such as free expression and other First 
Amendment rights. There are still other rights that we do not have and 
which lesbian and gay citizens may seek on the same basis ~ our 
<:<>J?patriots, ~?ng them national health care, an adequate standard of 
hvmg f~r all ~ltizenS, and environmental policies that will prevent the 
destruction of Irreplaceable. res0l?"ces. I situate marriage rights alongside 
~ese other struggles-m~age nghts for same-sex couples will provide us 
With access to a host of entitlements that are particularly vital for the low-
income and otherwise diseI?~owered among us, but also important to 
tho~e of us W~lO are more pnvileged. They offer lesbian and gay citizens a 
baSIS for making cultural claims that are meaningful to some, but not all of 
us-~ ~ay to locate ourselves within families, communities, and in relation 
to spmtual values, a way to order daily experience, and to achieve a basic 
s~dard of personal dignity. Whether they give us more of that oh-so-
desirable durable good, mental health, seems to me to be beside the point. 
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